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ABSTRACT
Bohmian mechanics and the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber theory provide opposite resolutions of the quantum measurement problem: the former postulates additional variables
(the particle positions) besides the wave function, whereas the latter implements spontaneous collapses of the wave function by a nonlinear and stochastic modiﬁcation of
Schrödinger’s equation. Still, both theories, when understood appropriately, share the
following structure: They are ultimately not about wave functions but about ‘matter’
moving in space, represented by either particle trajectories, ﬁelds on space-time, or a
discrete set of space-time points. The role of the wave function then is to govern the
motion of the matter.
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7

Bohmian mechanics (BM) and the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory
are two quantum theories without observers, and thus provide two possible
solutions of the measurement problem of quantum mechanics. However, they
would seem to have little in common beyond achieving the goal of describing
a possible reality in which observers would ﬁnd, for the outcomes of their
experiments, the probabilities prescribed by the quantum formalism. They are
two precise, unambiguous fundamental physical theories that describe and
explain the world around us, but they appear to do this by employing opposite
strategies. In Bohmian mechanics (Bohm [1952]; Bell [1966]; Dürr et al. [1992];
Berndl et al. [1995]) the wave function evolves according to the Schrödinger
equation but is not the complete description of the state at a given time; this
description involves further variables, traditionally called ‘hidden variables,’
namely the particle positions. In the GRW theory (Pearle [1976]; Ghirardi
et al. [1986]; Bell [1987a]; Bassi and Ghirardi [2003]), in contrast, the wave
function ψ describes the state of any physical system completely, but ψ collapses
spontaneously, thus departing from the Schrödinger evolution. That is, the two
theories choose different horns of the alternative that Bell formulated as his
conclusion from the measurement problem (Bell [1987a]): ‘Either the wave
function, as given by the Schrödinger equation, is not everything, or it is not
right.’
The two theories are always presented almost as dichotomical, as in the recent paper by Putnam ([2005]). Our suggestion here is instead that BM and
GRW theory have much more in common than one would expect at ﬁrst sight.
So much, indeed, that they should be regarded as being close to each other,
rather than opposite. The differences are less profound than the similarities,
provided that the GRW theory is understood appropriately, as involving variables describing matter in space-time. These variables we call the primitive
ontology (PO) of the theory, and they form the common structure of BM and
GRW. The gain from the comparison with BM is the insight that the GRW
theory can, and should, be understood in terms of the PO. We think this view
in terms of the PO provides a deeper understanding of the GRW theory in
particular, and of quantum theories without observers in general. To formulate
more clearly and advertise this view is our goal.
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2 Bohmian Mechanics
Bohmian mechanics is a theory of (nonrelativistic) particles in motion. The
motion of a system of N particles is provided by their world lines t → Qi (t),
i = 1, . . . , N, where Qi (t) denotes the position in R3 of the i -th particle at time
t. These world lines are determined by Bohm’s law of motion (Bohm [1952];
Bell [1966]; Dürr et al. [1992]; Berndl et al. [1995]),
ψ ∗ ∇i ψ

d Qi
ψ
= vi (Q1 , . . . , Q N ) =
Im ∗ (Q1 . . . , Q N ),
dt
mi
ψ ψ

(1)

where mi , i = 1, . . . , N, are the masses of the particles; the wave function ψ
evolves according to Schrödinger’s equation
∂ψ
= Hψ ,
(2)
∂t
where H is the usual non-relativistic Schrödinger Hamiltonian; for spinless
particles it is of the form
i

H=−

N

2 2
∇ + V,
2mk k

(3)

k=1

containing as parameters the masses of the particles as well as the potential
energy function V of the system.
In the usual yet unfortunate terminology, the actual positions Q1 , . . . , Q N
of the particles are the hidden variables of the theory: the variables which,
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After recalling what Bohmian mechanics is in Section 2, we introduce two
concrete examples of GRW theories in Section 3. These examples involve rather
different choices of crucial variables, describing matter in space-time, and give
us a sense of the range of possibilities for such variables. We discuss in Section 4
the notion of the primitive ontology (PO) of a theory (a notion introduced in
Dürr et al. [1992]) and connect it to Bell’s notion of ‘local beables’ (Bell [1976]).
In Section 4.1, we relate the primitive ontology of a theory to the notion of
physical equivalence between theories. We stress in Section 4.2 the connection,
ﬁrst discussed in Goldstein ([1998]), between the primitive ontology and symmetry properties, with particular concern for the generalization of such theories
to a relativistically invariant quantum theory without observers. In Section
4.3, we argue that a theory without a primitive ontology is at best profoundly
problematical. We proceed in Section 5 to an analysis of the differences between
GRW (with primitive ontology) and BM, and in Section 6 we discuss a variety
of possible theories. We consider in Section 7.1 a ‘no-collapse’ reformulation
of one of the GRW theories and in Section 7.2 a ‘collapse’ interpretation of
BM. These formulations enable us to better appreciate the common structure
of BM and the GRW theories, as well as the differences, as we discuss in Section 7.3. We conclude in Section 8 with a summary of this common structure.
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together with the wave function, provide a complete description of the system, the wave function alone providing only a partial, incomplete description. From the point of view of BM, however, this is a strange terminology
since it suggests that the main object of the theory is the wave function, with
the additional information provided by the particles’ positions playing a secondary role. The situation is rather much the opposite: BM is a theory of
particles; their positions are the primary variables, and the description in terms
of them must be completed by specifying the wave function to deﬁne the
dynamics (1).
As a consequence of Schrödinger’s equation and of Bohm’s law of motion,
the quantum equilibrium distribution |ψ(q)|2 is equivariant. This means that
if the conﬁguration Q(t) = (Q1 (t), . . . , Q N (t)) of a system is random with distribution |ψt |2 at some time t, then this will be true also for any other time t.
Thus, the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, which asserts that whenever a system
has wave function ψt , its conﬁguration Q(t) is random with distribution |ψt |2 ,
can consistently be assumed. This hypothesis is not as hypothetical as its name
may suggest: the quantum equilibrium hypothesis follows, in fact, by means of
the law of large numbers from the assumption that the (initial) conﬁguration
of the universe is typical (i.e., not-too-special) for the ||2 distribution, with
 being the (initial) wave function of the universe (Dürr et al. [1992]). The
situation resembles the way Maxwell’s distribution for velocities in a classical
gas follows from the assumption that the phase point of the gas is typical for
the uniform distribution on the energy surface.
As a consequence of the quantum equilibrium hypothesis, a Bohmian universe, even if deterministic, appears random to its inhabitants. In fact, the probability distributions observed by the inhabitants agree exactly with those of the
quantum formalism. To begin to understand why, note that any measurement
apparatus must also consist of Bohmian particles. Calling Q S the conﬁguration of the particles of the system to be measured and Q A the conﬁguration
of the particles of the apparatus, we can write for the conﬁguration of the big
Bohmian system relevant to the analysis of the measurement Q = (Q S, Q A).
Let us suppose that the initial wave function  of the big system is a product
state (q) = (q S, q A) = ψ(q S) φ(q A).
During the measurement, this  evolves according to the Schrödinger equa
tion, and in the case of an ideal measurement it evolves to t = α ψα φα ,
where α runs through the eigenvalues of the observable measured, φα is a state
of the apparatus in which the pointer points to the value α, and ψα is the projection of ψ to the appropriate eigenspace of the observable. By the quantum
equilibrium hypothesis, the probability for the random apparatus conﬁguration Q A(t) to be such as to correspond to the pointer pointing to the value
α is ψα 2 . For a more detailed discussion see (Dürr et al. [1992]; Dürr et al.
[2004b]).
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3 Ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber

i (x) =

 −x)2
(Q
i
1
e− 2σ 2 ,
2
3/2
(2πσ )

(4)

i is the position operator of ‘particle’ i . Here σ is a new constant of
where Q
nature of order of 10−7 m.
Let ψt0 be the initial wave function, i.e., the normalized wave function at
some time t0 arbitrarily chosen as initial time. Then ψ evolves in the following
way:
1. It evolves unitarily, according to Schrödinger’s equation, until a random time T1 = t0 + T1 , so that
ψT1 = U

T1 ψt0 ,

(5)

where Ut is the unitary operator Ut = e−  Ht corresponding to the
standard Hamiltonian H governing the system, e.g., given by (3) for
N spinless particles, and T1 is a random time distributed according
to the exponential distribution with rate Nλ (where the quantity λ is
another constant of nature of the theory,2 of order of 10−15 s−1 ).
i

2. At time T1 it undergoes an instantaneous collapse with random center
X1 and random label I1 according to
ψT1 → ψT1 + =

 I1 (X1 )1/2 ψT1
.
 I1 (X1 )1/2 ψT1 

(6)

I1 is chosen at random in the set {1, . . . , N} with uniform distribution.
The center of the collapse X1 is chosen randomly with probability

1

2

We wish to emphasize here that there are no particles in this theory: the word ‘particle’ is
used only for convenience in order to be able to use the standard notation and terminology.
Pearle and Squires ([1994]) have argued that λ should be chosen differently for every ‘particle,’
with λi proportional to the mass mi .
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The theory proposed by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber ([1986]) is in agreement
with the predictions of non-relativistic quantum mechanics as far as all present
experiments are concerned (Bassi and Ghirardi [2003]); for a discussion of
future experiments that may distinguish this theory from quantum mechanics,
see Section V of Bassi and Ghirardi ([2003]). According to the way in which this
theory is usually presented, the evolution of the wave function follows, instead
of Schrödinger’s equation, a stochastic jump process in Hilbert space. We shall
succinctly summarize this process as follows.
Consider a quantum system described (in the standard language) by an
N-‘particle’1 wave function ψ = ψ(q1 , . . . , q N ), qi ∈ R3 , i = 1, . . . , N; for any
point x in R3 (the ‘center’ of the collapse that will be deﬁned next), deﬁne on
the Hilbert space of the system the collapse operator
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P(X1 ∈ d x1 |ψT1 , I1 = i 1 ) = ψT1 |i 1 (x1 )ψT1 d x1 = i 1 (x1 )1/2 ψT1 2 d x1 .

(7)

In other words, the evolution of the wave function is the Schrödinger evolution interrupted by collapses. When the wave function is ψ, a collapse with
center x and label i occurs at rate
r (x, i |ψ) = λ ψ | i (x)ψ

(8)

and when this happens, the wave function changes to i (x)1/2 ψ/i (x)1/2 ψ.
Thus, if between time t0 and any time t > t0 , n collapses have occurred
at the times t0 < T1 < T2 < · · · < Tn < t, with centers X1 , . . . , Xn and labels
I1 , . . . , In , the wave function at time t will be
Fn
Lt,t
ψt
ψt =  Fn0 0  ,
 Lt,t ψt 
0

(9)

0

where Fn = {(X1 , T1 , I1 ), . . . , (Xn , Tn , In )} and
Fn
= Ut−Tn  In (Xn )1/2 UTn −Tn−1  In−1 (Xn−1 )1/2 UTn−1 −Tn−2 · · ·  I1 (X1 )1/2 UT1 −t0 .
Lt,t
0
(10)
Since Ti , Xi , Ii , and n are random, ψt is also random.
It should be noted that—unless t0 is the initial time of the universe—also ψt0
should be regarded as random, being determined by the collapses that occurred
at times earlier than t0 . However, given ψt0 , the statistics of the future evolution
of the wave function is completely determined; for example, the joint distribution of the ﬁrst n collapses after t0 , with particle labels I1 , . . . , In ∈ {1, . . . , N},
is
P(X1 ∈ d x1 , T1 ∈ dt1 , I1 = i 1 , . . . , Xn ∈ d xn , Tn ∈ dtn , In = i n |ψt0 )
 f
2
(11)
= λn e−Nλ(tn −t0 )  Ltnn,t0 ψt0  d x1 dt1 · · · d xn dtn ,
f

with fn = {(x1 , t1 , i 1 ), . . . , (xn , tn , i n )} and Ltnn,t0 given, mutatis mutandis,
by (10).
This is, more or less, all there is to say about the formulation of the GRW
theory according to most theorists. In contrast, Gian Carlo Ghirardi believes
that the description provided above is not the whole story, and we agree with
him. We believe that, depending on the choice of what we call the primitive
3

Hereafter, when no ambiguity could arise, we use the standard notations of probability theory,
according to which a capital letter, such as X, is used to denote a random variable, while the
values taken by it are denoted by small letters; X ∈ d x is a shorthand for X ∈ [x, x + d x], etc.
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3. Then the algorithm is iterated: ψT1 + evolves unitarily until a random
time T2 = T1 + T2 , where T2 is a random time (independent of
T1 ) distributed according to the exponential distribution with rate
Nλ, and so on.
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3.1 GRWm
In the ﬁrst version of the GRW theory, denoted by GRWm, the PO is given
by a ﬁeld: We have a variable m(x, t) for every point x ∈ R3 in space and every
time t, deﬁned by

N


2
mi
dq1 · · · dq N δ(qi − x) ψ(q1 , . . . , q N , t) .
(12)
m(x, t) =
i =1

R3N

In words, one starts with the |ψ|2 -distribution in conﬁguration space R3N ,
then obtains the marginal distribution of the i th degree of freedom qi ∈ R3 by
integrating out all other variables q j , j = i , multiplies by the mass associated
with qi , and sums over i . GRWm was essentially proposed by Ghirardi and
co-workers in Benatti et al. ([1995]);4 see also Goldstein ([1998]).
The ﬁeld m(·, t) is supposed to be understood as the density of matter in
space at time t. Since these variables are functionals of the wave function ψ,
they are not ‘hidden variables’ since, unlike the positions in BM, they need not
be speciﬁed in addition to the wave function, but rather are determined by it.
Nonetheless, they are additional elements of the GRW theory that need to be
posited in order to have a complete description of the world in the framework
of that theory.
GRWm is a theory about the behavior of a ﬁeld m(·, t) on three-dimensional
space. The microscopic description of reality provided by the matter density
ﬁeld m(·, t) is not particle-like but instead continuous, in contrast to the particle
ontology of BM. This is reminiscent of Schrödinger’s early view of the wave
function as representing a continuous matter ﬁeld. But while Schrödinger was
obliged to abandon his early view because of the tendency of the wave function to spread, the spontaneous wave function collapses built into the GRW
theory tend to localize the wave function, thus counteracting this tendency and
overcoming the problem.
A parallel with BM begins to emerge: GRWm and BM both essentially involve more than the wave function. In one the matter is spread out continuously,
while in the other it is concentrated in ﬁnitely many particles; however, both

4

They ﬁrst proposed (for a model slightly more complicated than the one considered here) that
the matter density be given by an expression similar to (12) but this difference is not relevant for
our purposes.
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ontology (PO) of the theory, there are correspondingly different versions of the
theory. We will discuss the notion of primitive ontology in detail in Section 4.
In the subsections below, we present two versions of the GRW theory, based
on two different choices of the PO, namely the matter density ontology (in Section 3.1) and the ﬂash ontology (in Section 3.2).

360

V. Allori, S. Goldstein, R. Tumulka and N. Zanghı̀

theories are concerned with matter in three-dimensional space, and in some
regions of space there is more than in others.
You may ﬁnd GRWm a surprising proposal. You may ask, was it not the point
of GRW—perhaps even its main advantage over BM—that it can do without
objects beyond the wave function, such as particle trajectories or matter density?
Is not the dualism present in GRWm unnecessary? That is, what is wrong with
the version of the GRW theory, which we call GRW0, which involves just
the wave function and nothing else? We will return to these questions in Section 4.3. To be sure, if there was nothing wrong with GRW0, then, by simplicity,
it should be preferable to GRWm. We stress, however, that Ghirardi must regard
GRW0 as seriously deﬁcient; otherwise he would not have proposed anything
like GRWm. We will indicate in Section 4.3 why we think Ghirardi is correct.
To establish the inadequacy of GRW0 is not, however, the main point of this
paper.

3.2 GRWf
According to another version of the GRW theory, which was ﬁrst suggested by
Bell ([1987a], [1989]), then adopted in (Kent [1989]; Goldstein [1998]; Tumulka
[2006a], [2006b]; Allori et al. [2005]; Maudlin [2008]), and here denoted by
GRWf, the PO is given by ‘events’ in space-time called ﬂashes, mathematically
described by points in space-time. This is, admittedly, an unusual PO, but it
is a possible one nonetheless. In GRWf matter is made neither of particles
following world lines, such as in classical or Bohmian mechanics, nor of a
continuous distribution of matter such as in GRWm, but rather of discrete
points in space-time, in fact ﬁnitely many points in every bounded space-time
region; see Figure 1.
In the GRWf theory, the space-time locations of the ﬂashes can be read
off from the history of the wave function given by (9) and (10): every ﬂash
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Figure 1. A typical pattern of ﬂashes in space-time, and thus a possible world
according to the GRWf theory.
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corresponds to one of the spontaneous collapses of the wave function, and its
space-time location is just the space-time location of that collapse. Accordingly,
Equation (11) gives the joint distribution of the ﬁrst n ﬂashes, after some initial
time t0 . The ﬂashes form the set

(with T1 < T2 < · · ·).
In Bell’s words,
[. . .] the GRW jumps (which are part of the wave function, not something else) are well localized in ordinary space. Indeed each is centered
on a particular spacetime point (x, t). So we can propose these events
as the basis of the ‘local beables’ of the theory. These are the mathematical counterparts in the theory to real events at deﬁnite places and
times in the real world (as distinct from the many purely mathematical
constructions that occur in the working out of physical theories, as distinct from things which may be real but not localized, and distinct from
the ‘observables’ of other formulations of quantum mechanics, for which
we have no use here). A piece of matter then is a galaxy of such events.
(Bell [1987a])

That is, Bell’s idea is that GRW can account for objective reality in threedimensional space in terms of space-time points (Xk , Tk ) that correspond to
the localization events (collapses) of the wave function. Note that if the number
N of the degrees of freedom in the wave function is large, as in the case of a
macroscopic object, the number of ﬂashes is also large (if λ = 10−15 s−1 and
N = 1023 , we obtain 108 ﬂashes per second). Therefore, for a reasonable choice
of the parameters of the GRWf theory, a cubic centimeter of solid matter
contains more than 108 ﬂashes per second. That is to say that large numbers of
ﬂashes can form macroscopic shapes, such as tables and chairs. That is how we
ﬁnd an image of our world in GRWf.
Note, however, that at almost every time space is in fact empty, containing
no ﬂashes and thus no matter. Thus, while the atomic theory of matter entails
that space is not everywhere continuously ﬁlled with matter but rather is largely
void, GRWf entails that at most times space is entirely void.
According to this theory, the world is made of ﬂashes and the wave function
serves as the tool to generate the ‘law of evolution’ for the ﬂashes: Equation (8) gives the rate of the ﬂash process—the probability per unit time of the
ﬂash of label i occurring at the point x. For this reason, we prefer the word
‘ﬂash’ to ‘hitting’ or ‘collapse center’: the latter words suggest that the role
of these events is to affect the wave function, or that they are not more than
certain facts about the wave function, whereas ‘ﬂash’ suggests rather something
like an elementary event. Since the wave function ψ evolves in a random way,
F = {(Xk , Tk ) : k ∈ N} is a random subset of space-time, a point process in
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F = {(X1 , T1 ), . . . , (Xk , Tk ), . . .}
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space-time, as probabilists would say. GRWf is thus a theory whose output is a
point process in space-time.5

3.3 Empirical equivalence between GRWm and GRWf

4 Primitive Ontology
The matter density ﬁeld in GRWm, the ﬂashes in GRWf, and the particle trajectories in BM have something in common: they form (what we have called) the
5

An anonymous referee has remarked that according to GRWf with the original parameters, in
a single living cell there might occur as few as one ﬂash per hour, so that the cell is empty of
matter for surprisingly long periods, quite against our intuition of a cell as a rather classical
object. We make a few remarks to this objection. First, one should of course be careful with the
language: there is presumably no cell in GRWf, though the structure of the wave function (on
conﬁguration space—even though there are no conﬁgurations) might suggest otherwise. Second,
it all depends on the choice of the parameters λ and σ , and, as long as experiments have not ﬁxed
their values, this cell argument may indeed be an argument for a choice different from GRW’s
original one (say, with larger λ and larger σ ). We do not wish to argue here for any particular
choice. Third, while most people might expect a cell to be real in much the same way as (say) a
cat, one would not necessarily expect this of a single atom. Thus, it seems quite conceivable that,
at some critical scale between that of atoms and that of cats, the ontological character of objects
changes—as indeed it does in GRWf because of the limited resolution of matter given by the
space-time density of ﬂashes (e.g., in water approximately one ﬂash every 20 µm every second).
The cell example shows that the critical scale in GRWf is larger than one might have expected,
and thus that GRWf is a mildly quirky picture of the world. But this mild quirkiness should be
seen in perspective. In comparison, many other views about quantum reality are heavily eccentric,
as they propose that reality is radically different from what we normally think it is like: e.g., that
there exist parallel worlds, or that there exists no matter at all, or that reality is contradictory in
itself.
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We remark that GRWm and GRWf are empirically equivalent, i.e., they make
always and exactly the same predictions for the outcomes of experiments. In
other words, there is no experiment we could possibly perform that would tell
us whether we are in a GRWm world or in a GRWf world, assuming we are in
one of the two. This should be contrasted with the fact that there are possible
experiments (though we cannot perform any with the present technology) that
decide whether we are in a Bohmian world or in a GRW world.
The reason is simple. Consider any experiment, which is ﬁnished at time t.
Consider the same realization of the wave function on the time interval [0, t],
but associated with different primitive ontologies in the two worlds. At time t,
the result gets written down, encoded in the shape of the ink; more abstractly,
the result gets encoded in the position of some macroscopic amount of matter.
If in the GRWf ontology, this matter is in position 1, then the ﬂashes must be
located in position 1; thus, the collapses are centered at position 1; thus, the
wave function is near zero at position 2; thus, by (12) the density of matter is
low at position 2 and high at position 1; thus, in GRWm the matter is also in
position 1, displaying the same result as in the GRWf world.
We will discuss empirical equivalence again in Section 7.3.
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primitive ontology of these theories. The PO of a theory—and its behavior—is
what the theory is fundamentally about. It is closely connected with what Bell
called the ‘local beables’:

The elements of the primitive ontology are the stuff that things are made of.
The wave function also belongs to the ontology of GRWm, GRWf, and BM,
but not to the PO: according to these theories, physical objects are not made of
wave functions.6 Instead, the role of the wave function in these theories is quite
different, as we will see in the following.
In each of these theories, the only reason the wave function is of any interest
at all is that it is relevant to the behavior of the PO. Roughly speaking, the wave
function tells the matter how to move. In BM the wave function determines
the motion of the particles via Equation (1); in GRWm the wave function
determines the distribution of matter in the most immediate way via Equation (12); and in GRWf the wave function determines the probability distribution of the future ﬂashes via Equation (11).
We now see a clear parallel between BM and the GRW theory, at least in its
versions GRWm and GRWf. Each of these theories is about matter in spacetime, what might be called a decoration of space-time. Each involves a dual
structure (X , ψ): the PO X providing the decoration, and the wave function
ψ governing the PO. The wave function in each of these theories, which has the
role of generating the dynamics for the PO, has a nomological character utterly
absent in the PO. This difference is crucial for understanding the symmetry
properties of these theories and therefore is vital for the construction of a
Lorentz invariant quantum theory without observers, as we will discuss in
Section 4.2.
Even the Copenhagen interpretation (orthodox quantum theory, OQT)
involves a dual structure: what might be regarded as its PO is the
classical description of macroscopic objects, which Bohr insisted was
indispensable—including in particular pointer orientations conveying the outcomes of experiments—with the wave function serving to determine the probability relations between the successive states of these objects. In this way, ψ
governs a PO, even for OQT. An important difference, however, between OQT
6

We would not go so far as Dowker and Herbauts ([2005]) and Nelson ([1985]), who have suggested
that, physically, the wave function does not exist at all, and only the PO exists. But we have to
admit that this view is a possibility, in fact a more serious one than the widespread view that no
PO exists.
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[I]n the words of Bohr, ‘it is decisive to recognize that, however far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation, the account
of all evidence must be expressed in classical terms.’ It is the ambition of the
theory of local beables to bring these ‘classical terms’ into the equations,
and not relegate them entirely to the surrounding talk. (Bell [1976])
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4.1 Primitive ontology and physical equivalence
To appreciate the concept of PO, it might be useful to regard the positions of
particles, the mass density and the ﬂashes, respectively, as the output of BM,
GRWm, and GRWf, with the wave function, in contrast, serving as part of
an algorithm that generates this output. Suppose we want to write a computer
program for simulating a system (or a universe) according to a certain theory.
For writing the program, we have to face the question: Which among the many
variables to compute should be the output of the program? All other variables
are internal variables of the program: they may be necessary for doing the
computation, but they are not what the user is interested in. In the way we
propose to understand BM, GRWm, and GRWf, the output of the program,
the result of the simulation, should be the particle world lines, the m(·, t)
ﬁeld, respectively the ﬂashes; the output should look like Figure 1. The wave
function, in contrast, is one of the internal variables and its role is to implement
the evolution for the output, the PO of the theory.
Moreover, note that there might be different ways of producing the same
output, using different internal variables. For example, two wave functions
that differ by a gauge transformation generate the same law for the PO. In
more detail, when (external) magnetic ﬁelds are incorporated into BM by
replacing all derivatives ∇k in (1) and (2) by ∇k − i ek A(qk ), where A is the
vector potential and ek is the electric charge of particle k, then the gauge
transformation
ψ → ei



k ek

f (qk )

ψ,

A → A + ∇ f

(13)

does not change the trajectories nor the quantum equilibrium distribution. As
another example, one can write the law for the PO in either the Schrödinger
or the Heisenberg picture. As a consequence, the same law for the PO is generated by either an evolving wave function and static operators or a static wave
function and evolving operators. In more detail, BM can be reformulated in
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on the one hand and BM, GRWm, and GRWf on the other is that the latter are
fully precise about what belongs to the PO (particle trajectories, respectively
continuous matter density or ﬂashes) whereas the Copenhagen interpretation
is rather vague, even noncommittal, on this point, since the notion of ‘macroscopic’ is an intrinsically vague one: of how many atoms need an object consist
in order to be macroscopic? And, what exactly constitutes a ‘classical description’ of a macroscopic object?
Therefore, as the example of the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum
mechanics makes vivid, an adequate fundamental physical theory, one with
any pretension to precision, must involve a PO deﬁned on the microscopic
scale.
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the Heisenberg picture by rewriting the law of motion as follows:
i (t)]|ψ
d Qi
1 ψ|P(dq, t)[H, Q
= − Im
(q = Q(t)) ,
dt

ψ|P(dq, t)|ψ

(14)

4.2 Primitive ontology and symmetry
The peculiar ﬂash ontology was invented by Bell in 1987 as a step toward a
relativistic GRW theory. He wrote (Bell [1987a]) about GRWf:
I am particularly struck by the fact that the model is as Lorentz invariant
as it could be in the nonrelativistic version. It takes away the ground of my
fear that any exact formulation of quantum mechanics must conﬂict with
fundamental Lorentz invariance.

What Bell refers to in the above quotation is the following. An analogue of the
relativity of simultaneity, i.e., of the invariance of the dynamics under boosts,
7

While the notion of PO is similar to Bell’s notion of local beables, it should be observed that
not all local beables, such as the electric and magnetic ﬁelds in classical electrodynamics, need
to be regarded as part of the PO. Moreover, the very conception that the PO must involve only
local beables (i.e., be represented by mathematical objects grounded in familiar three-dimensional
space) could in principle be questioned; this is, however, a rather delicate and difﬁcult question
that will be brieﬂy addressed in Section 4.3 but that deserves a thorough analysis that will be
undertaken in a separate work (Allori et al. [unpublished (b)]).
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i (t)
where H is the Hamiltonian (e.g., for N spinless particles given by (3)), Q
is the (Heisenberg-evolved) position operator (or, more precisely, triple of operators corresponding to the three dimensions of physical space) for particle i and P(·, t) is the projection-valued measure (PVM) deﬁned by the joint
spectral decomposition of all (Heisenberg-evolved) position operators (Dürr
et al. [2005b]).
We suggest that two theories be regarded as physically equivalent when they
lead to the same history of the PO. Conversely, one could deﬁne the notion of
PO in terms of physical equivalence: The PO is described by those variables
that remain invariant under all physical equivalences. We discuss this issue in
more detail in Sections 7.1 and 7.2, when presenting some examples.
What is ‘primitive’ about the primitive ontology? That becomes clear when
we realize in what way the other objects in the theory (such as the wave function,
or the magnetic ﬁeld in classical physics) are nonprimitive: One can explain what
they are by explaining how they govern the behavior of the PO, while it is the
entities of the PO that make direct contact with the world of our experience.
We can directly compare the motion of matter in our world with the motion of
matter in the theory, at least on the macroscopic scale. The other objects in the
theory can be compared to our world only indirectly, by the way they affect the
PO.7
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The possible histories of the PO, those that are allowed by the theory, when
transformed according to the symmetry, will again be possible histories for
the theory, and the possible probability distributions on the histories, those
that are allowed by the theory, when transformed according to the symmetry,
will again be possible probability distributions for the theory.

Let us explain.
• ‘The possible histories of the PO, those that are allowed by the theory. . .’
We give some examples, involving Galilean invariance. In classical mechanics
the meaning is straightforward: the PO is that of particles, described by their
positions in physical space, a history of this PO corresponds to a collection
of particle trajectories—the trajectories Qi (t), i = 1, . . . , N, in a universe of N
particles—and a history is allowed if the particles obey Newton’s law, i.e., if
mi Q̈i (t) = Fi (Q1 (t), . . . , Q N (t)), where Fi is the Newtonian force acting on the
i th particle. The theory is deﬁned once the form of Fi is speciﬁed (for example,
that the force is the Newtonian gravitational force).
Consider now BM: also here the PO is that of particles and a possible history
of the PO—one that is allowed by BM—is a history described by the particle trajectories Qi (t), i = 1, . . . , N, which satisfy Equation (1) for some wave
function ψ satisfying Equation (2). The theory is deﬁned once the Hamiltonian H in (2) is speciﬁed (for example, as given by (3), for a choice of the
potential V).
• ‘. . . when transformed according to the symmetry. . . ’ Since the PO is represented by a geometrical entity in physical space (a decoration of spacetime, as we have said earlier), space-time symmetries naturally act on it; for
example, transforming trajectories Qi (t) to trajectories Q̃i (t). For example,
under a Galilean boost (by a relative velocity v), in classical mechanics as
well as in BM, the trajectories Qi (t) transform into the boosted trajectories
Q̃i (t) = Qi (t) + vt.
• ‘. . . will again be possible histories for the theory. . . ’ Notice that Qi (t) and
Q̃i (t) may arise in BM from different wave functions. In other words, the wave
function must also be transformed when transforming the history of the PO.
However, while there is a natural transformation of the history of the PO, there
is not necessarily a corresponding natural change of the wave function. The
latter is allowed to change in any way, solely determined by its relationship to
the PO. For example, consider again a Galilean boost (by a relative velocity v)
in BM: the boosted trajectories Q̃i (t) = Qi (t) + vt form again a solution of (1)
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in the framework of a nonrelativistic theory is the invariance under relative
time translations for two very distant systems. Bell ([1987a], [1989]) veriﬁed
by direct calculation that GRWf has this symmetry. However, it is important
here to appreciate what this invariance means. To say that a theory has a given
symmetry is to say that

Bohmian Mechanics and GRW Theory

367

and (2) with ψ replaced by the transformed wave function8
 N


i
1 2
mi (qi · v − 2 v t) ψt (q1 − vt, . . . , q N − vt).
ψ̃t (q1 , . . . , q N ) = exp 
i =1

i (x + vt)1/2 G t = G t i (x)1/2 .

8

Under this transformation V = V(q1 , . . . , q N ) in (2) must be replaced by Ṽ = V(q1 −
vt, . . . , q N − vt). For V arising from the standard two-body interactions, we have that V = Ṽ,
and hence the theory is invariant.

Downloaded from http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/ at Periodicals Dept University Libraries Northern Illinois University on April 5, 2016

(15)
Since the trajectories of the PO transformed according to the symmetry are
still solutions, BM is symmetric under Galilean transformation, even though
the corresponding wave function has to undergo more than a simple change of
variables in order to make this possible.
• ‘. . . and the possible probability distributions on the histories, those that are
allowed by the theory . . .’ In a deterministic theory, a probability distribution
on the histories arises from a probability distribution on the initial conditions. In BM, a probability distribution on histories is possible if there exists
a wave function ψ such that the given distribution is the one induced on solutions to (1) by the probability distribution |ψ(q1 , . . . , q N )|2 at some initial
time.
More interesting is the case of nondeterministic theories. For these theories,
i.e., for theories involving stochasticity at the fundamental level, the law for
the PO amounts to a speciﬁcation of possible probability distributions; for
example, by specifying the generator, or transition probabilities, of a Markov
process. For example, in GRWm the history of the PO is the mass density ﬁeld
m(·, ·), and a probability distribution on the histories of this PO is possible if it
is the distribution induced on m(·, ·), according to Equation (12), by some wave
function ψ with probability law given, say, by (11) (and (9)). The case of GRWf
is analogous: a probability distribution for the ﬂashes F = {(Xk , Tk ) : k ∈ N} is
possible if induced by (11) for some wave function ψ.
• ‘. . . when transformed according to the symmetry, will again be possible probability distributions for the theory.’ The probability distribution on the histories,
when transformed according to the symmetry, is the distribution of the transformed histories. In other words, the action of a transformation on every history
determines the transformation of a probability distribution on the space of histories. As in the deterministic case, the wave function is allowed to change in
any way compatible with its relationship to the PO. For example, consider the
Galilean invariance of GRWf: let ψ and ψ̃ be two initial wave functions related
as in (15), that is, by the usual formula for Galilean transformations in quantum
mechanics. Let G t denote the transformation operator in (15) at time t, such
that ψ̃t = G t ψt . A simple calculation shows that
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As a consequence, the distribution (7) of the (spatial location of the) ﬁrst ﬂash
arising from ψ̃T1 is that arising from ψT1 shifted by vT1 , and the post-collapse
wave functions (6) are still related by the appropriate G t operator, i.e.,

Thus, the joint distribution of ﬂashes arising from ψ̃ is just the one arising from
ψ shifted by vt for every t.
Going back to the work of Bell mentioned in the beginning of this section
(Bell [1987a]), what Bell had to do for GRWf, and what he did, was to conﬁrm the invariance under relative time translations of the stochastic law for
F = {(Xk , Tk ) : k ∈ N}, the galaxy of ﬂashes. And more generally the invariance of GRWf directly concerns the stochastic law for the PO; it concerns the
invariance of the law for the wave function only indirectly, contrary to what
is often, erroneously, believed. Under a space-time symmetry the PO must be
transformed in accordance with its intrinsic geometrical nature, while wave
functions (and other elements of the nonprimitive ontology, if any) should be
transformed in a manner dictated by their relationship to the PO.
Moreover, note that there is no reason to believe that when changing the
PO of a theory the symmetry properties of the theory will remain unchanged.
Actually, the opposite is true. This fact was pointed out in Goldstein ([1998])
and has recently been emphasized also in Tumulka ([2006a]), in which it has
been shown that GRWf, without interaction, can be modiﬁed so as to become
a relativistic quantum theory without observers.9 In that paper, the stochastic
law for the galaxy of the ﬂashes in space-time, the PO of GRWf, with suitably modiﬁed, Lorentz-invariant equations, has been shown explicitly to be
relativistically invariant (see also Tumulka [2006c]). Hence, GRWf is Lorentz
invariant, but GRWm is not. Thus, one should not ask whether GRW as such
is Lorentz invariant, since the answer to this question depends on the choice
of PO for GRW. For details, see (Maudlin [2008]). Similar results to those of
(Tumulka [2006a]) have been obtained also by Dowker and Henson ([2004])
for a relativistic collapse theory on the lattice (see also Dowker and Herbauts
[2004], [2005]).
We conclude with some remarks on OQT. Here the relevant PO consists,
rather vaguely of course, of the ‘pointer variables’ registering the results of experiments that are spoken of as measurements of quantum observables. Though
OQT provides neither detailed histories of the PO nor probability distributions
9

To put this result into perspective, note that the absence of interaction does not make the problem
trivial. On the contrary, the main difﬁculty with devising a relativistic quantum theory without
observers arises already in the noninteracting case: To specify a law for the PO that is relativistic
but nonlocal. Note further that it would not have sufﬁced to specify a Lorentz-invariant evolution
law for ψ (entailing suitable collapse) while leaving open the law for the PO. Finally, note that
for GRWm and BM it is not known how to make them ‘seriously’ relativistic, i.e., without the
incorporation of additional structure that yields a foliation of space-time.
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<A>ψ =

ψ |Aψ
.
ψ | ψ

(16)

Now consider the action of a symmetry on the experiment E: it transforms
E to the experiment Ẽ arising from the natural action of the symmetry on the
physical processes deﬁning E. If E is a measurement of the operator A—that is, if
the probability distribution of the results of E are given by the spectral measures
for A—then Ẽ will be a measurement of the operator Ã arising from A under
the symmetry. While E and Ẽ are of course (usually) different experiments, it is
obvious from their relationship that the distribution of the results of E when
the system is in the state ψ is the same as the distribution of the results of Ẽ
when the transformed system is in the transformed state ψ̃. In particular, where
E is a measurement of A, we have that
<A>ψ =

ψ |Aψ
ψ̃ | Ãψ̃
= < Ã>ψ̃ .
=
ψ | ψ
ψ̃ | ψ̃

(17)

According to the analysis of Wigner ([1939]) and Bargmann ([1954]), these
transformations on wave functions and operators are given by unitary or antiunitary operators U, i.e., ψ̃ = Uψ, Ã = U AU −1 , where U is an element of a
unitary-projective representation of the symmetry group.
Note that while the distribution of the result of the experiment is, for trivial reasons, unaffected by the symmetry transformation, the macroscopic PO
is in fact transformed. For example, a rotated experiment will involve a rotated ‘pointer position,’ or a rotated computer printout. But what the pointer
is pointing to, and what the printout says, will not change. In other words,
the numerical result Z of an experiment E should not be confused with the
macroscopic conﬁguration M of the pointer variables, the PO of OQT,
the former being indeed a function of the latter, i.e., Z = f (M), with the function f expressing the ‘calibration’ of the experiment. In Ẽ, the rotated experiment, the PO (the pointer orientation) changes together with the calibration: the
pointer points in a different direction M̃ and the scale f is rotated into f˜ such
that f˜( M̃) = f (M).
Thus, when all is said and done, although the PO of OQT is rather vague and
imprecise, insofar as symmetry is concerned the situation is indeed analogous
to that of theories, such as BM or GRWf, having a clear and exactly speciﬁed
PO: also for OQT the possible probability distributions on the PO, those that
are allowed by the theory, when transformed according to the symmetry, will
again be possible probability distributions for the theory.
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thereof, it does provide probability distributions for the results of measurements
registered by the PO, which are given by the appropriate spectral measures for
the self-adjoint operators representing the observables. In particular, the mean
value of the result of the measurement E of the quantum observable represented
by the self-adjoint operator A for a system in the state ψ is
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4.3 Without primitive ontology

[. . .] the wave function as a whole lives in a much bigger space, of 3N
dimensions. It makes no sense to ask for the amplitude or phase or whatever
of the wave function at a point in ordinary space. It has neither amplitude
nor phase nor anything else until a multitude of points in ordinary threespace are speciﬁed.

In contrast, if a law is, like the GRW process in Hilbert space, about
a mathematical object, like ψ, living in some abstract space, like R3N , it
seems necessary to have or to add something more in order to make contact with a description in 3-space. For example, formulations of classical
mechanics utilizing conﬁguration space R3N or phase space R6N (such as
Euler–Lagrange’s or Hamilton’s) are connected with a PO in 3-space (particles with trajectories) by the deﬁnitions of conﬁguration space and phase
space.
If, as we believe, a PO given by local beables is so crucial for a theory to make
sense as a fundamental physical theory, one might wonder how GRW0 could
be taken seriously by so many serious people (see, e.g., Albert [1992]; Albert
[1996]; Nicrosini and Rimini [2003]; Lewis [2005]). One reason, perhaps, is that
if the wave function ψ is suitably collapsed, i.e., concentrated on a subset S
of conﬁguration space such that all conﬁgurations in S look macroscopically
the same, all corresponding for example to a pointer pointing in the same way,
then we can easily imagine what a world in the state ψ is macroscopically like:
namely like the macrostate deﬁned by conﬁgurations from S. For example,
when in GRW0 the wave function is concentrated near q, where q is a conﬁguration describing a pointer pointing to the value a, it is easy to feel justiﬁed in
concluding that there is a pointer that is pointing to the value a, and to forget
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Now let us turn to the question: What is wrong with GRW0, the bare version of GRW, which involves just the wave function and nothing else? Why
does one need a PO at all? Our answer is that we do not see how the existence and behavior of tables and chairs and the like could be accounted for
without positing a primitive ontology—a description of matter in space and
time.
The aim of a fundamental physical theory is, we believe, to describe the world
around us, and in so doing to explain our experiences to the extent of providing
an account of their macroscopic counterparts, an account of the behavior of
objects in 3-space. Thus it seems that for a fundamental physical theory to be
satisfactory, it must involve, and fundamentally be about, ‘local beables,’ and
not just a beable such as the wave function, which is nonlocal: In the words of
Bell ([1987a])
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The GRW-type theories have nothing in their kinematics but the wavefunction. It gives the density (in a multidimensional conﬁguration space!) of
stuff. To account for the narrowness of that stuff in macroscopic dimensions, the linear Schrödinger equation has to be modiﬁed, in the GRW
picture by a mathematically prescribed spontaneous collapse mechanism.
[Emphasis in the original.]

He made a similar remark to Ghirardi (quoted by the latter in Bassi and
Ghirardi [2003], p. 345) in a letter dated October 3, 1989:
As regards ψ and the density of stuff, I think it is important that this
density is in the 3N-dimensional conﬁguration space. So I have not thought
of relating it to ordinary matter or charge density in 3-space. Even for one
particle I think one would have problems with the latter. So I am inclined
to the view you mention ‘as it is sufﬁcient for an objective interpretation’
. . . And it has to be stressed that the ‘stuff’ is in 3N-space—or whatever
corresponds in ﬁeld theory.

As we have indicated already, we don’t understand this proposal, which
clearly suffers from the difﬁculties discussed above. Whoever suggests that
matter exists not in 3-space but in 3N-space must bridge the gap between an
ontology in 3N-space and the behavior of objects in 3-space. Strategies for
doing so have in fact been proposed; see Albert ([1996]) for a proposal and
Monton ([2002]) for a critique. For the reasons mentioned above, we do not
believe that they can succeed.
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that we are dealing with a theory for which there exists no arrangement of stuff
in physical three-dimensional space at all.
Since the macroscopic description does not depend on whether the PO consists of world lines, ﬂashes, or a continuous distribution of matter, and since
the reasoning does not even mention the PO, it is easy to overlook the fact that
a further law needs to be invoked, one which prescribes how the wave function
is related to the PO, and implies that for wave functions such as described,
the PO is such that its macroscopic appearance coincides (very probably) with
the macroscopic appearance of conﬁgurations in S. To overlook this step is
even easier when focusing very much on the measurement problem, whose central difﬁculty is that the wave function of object plus apparatus, if it evolves
linearly, typically becomes a superposition of macroscopically distinct wave
functions like ψ, which thus contains no hint of the actual outcome of the
experiment.
Interestingly enough, after having underlined the importance of local beables
for a fundamental physical theory, Bell proposed GRW to be about ‘stuff’ in
conﬁguration (3N-dimensional) space. In his celebrated analysis of the quantum measurement problem (Bell [1990]), he wrote:
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4.4 Primitive ontology and quantum state

r (x, i |ψ) = λ

ψ | i (x)ψ
.
ψ |ψ

(18)

In GRWm, wave functions differing by a multiplicative constant of modulus 1
deﬁne the same evolution of the mass density ﬁeld (12). If the wave function is
multiplied by a more general constant, in order to ensure the same evolution
of the mass density the right-hand side of (12) could be divided by ψ|ψ . But
this is perhaps unnecessary, since universal mass densities that differ only by a
multiplicative constant are arguably physically equivalent.
GRW0, involving only wave functions, does not allow us to make the same
kind of argument; it is thus not clear for GRW0 why ψ should be regarded as
projective, though the structure of GRW0 is compatible with doing so.
To sum up, the projective nature of the quantum state can be regarded as
a consequence of the axioms of OQT, BM, GRWm, and GRWf, but not of
GRW0.

5 Differences between BM and GRW
We have stressed the similarity between BM and GRW. There are, of course, also
signiﬁcant differences. Perhaps the most obvious is that in BM the Schrödinger
evolution is exact, but not in GRW. However, this difference is not so crucial.
In fact we will present in Section 7.1 a reformulation of GRWf in which the
Schrödinger evolution is exact.

10

And insofar as probabilities are concerned, if ψ is not normalized, these are given by
|ψ(q)|2 /ψ|ψ , which is projective.
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It is well known that in OQT the quantum state is naturally projective. That
is, quantum states are best regarded as mathematically represented by rays
in the system’s Hilbert space H , i.e., by the elements of the projective space
P(H ), consisting of equivalence classes of wave functions ψ ∈ H differing by
a multiplicative constant. This follows from the rule (16) for the mean value of
an observable represented by a self-adjoint operator A for a system in the state
ψ. Wave functions ψ differing by a multiplicative constant give the same mean
value to all observables A.
Similarly, in BM the quantum state is naturally projective: it follows from (1)
that wave functions differing by a multiplicative constant are associated with
the same vector ﬁeld, and thus generate the same dynamics for the PO.10
In GRWf the quantum state is also naturally projective. Of course, for general
ψ (not necessarily normalized), instead of (8) the rate for the ﬂashes should be
given by
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5.1 Primitive ontology and quadratic functionals
It is worth noting a feature of the mathematical structure of GRWf that it shares
with OQT, but that is absent in, for example, BM and GRWm. It concerns the
dependence on the (initial) wave function ψ of the probability distribution Pψ
that the theory deﬁnes on its space
of histories of the PO. In BM,
is
the space of continuous paths in conﬁguration space R3N , and the measure
Pψ corresponds to the quantum equilibrium measure, and is concentrated on
a 3N-dimensional submanifold of , namely the solutions of Bohm’s equation (1). In GRWf, is the space of discrete subsets of space-time (possibly
with labels 1, . . . , N), and the measure Pψ is given by (11). In GRWm, is
a space of ﬁelds on space-time, and Pψ the image under the mapping ψ → m
given by (12) of the distribution of the Markov process (ψt )t≥0 .
In GRWf and OQT, but not in BM or GRWm, Pψ is a quadratic functional
of ψ. More precisely, in GRWf and OQT it is of the form
Pψ (·) = ψ|E(·)ψ ,

(19)

where E(·) is the positive-operator-valued measure (POVM) on that can be
read off from (11) for GRWf, and is the POVM associated with the results of
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A related important difference is that the empirical predictions of BM agree
exactly and always with those of the quantum formalism (whenever the latter
is unambiguous) while the predictions of the GRW theory don’t. (The latter
agree only approximately and in most cases.) In particular, one can empirically
distinguish BM from the GRW theory. (However, no decisive test could as
yet be performed; see Bassi and Ghirardi ([2003]) for details.) The empirical
disagreement between the two theories is usually explained by appealing to the
fact that in one theory the wave function obeys the Schrödinger evolution while
in the other it does not. However, especially in light of the reformulation of
GRWf we shall describe in Section 7.1, the empirical inequivalence between the
two theories should be better regarded as having a different origin. Though we
shall elaborate on this issue in Section 7.3, we shall anticipate the mathematical
roots of such a difference in Section 5.2 (which, however, may be skipped on a
ﬁrst reading of this paper).
A difference in the mathematical structure of GRWf (and OQT) on the
one hand and BM (but also GRWm) on the other concerns the probability
distribution that each of these theories deﬁnes on its space of histories of the
PO. This probability distribution is a quadratic functional of the initial ψ for
GRWf and OQT, but not for BM and GRWm. This feature is at the origin of why
GRWf can be modiﬁed so as to become a fully relativistically invariant theory
(see the end of Section 4.2). It will be discussed in the following subsection,
which, however, will not be needed for understanding the rest of the paper.
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S

lead to the same distribution

Pµ (·) =
µ(dψ) Pψ (·) = tr(E(·)ρ̂µ ) = Pµ (·)

(21)

S

on . This is notoriously not true in BM (Bell [1980]). It is not true in GRWm
either, as one easily checks, for example by considering, at just one single time,
the following two ensembles of wave functions for Schrödinger’s cat: µ gives
probability 12 to 2−1/2 (|dead + |alive ) and 12 to 2−1/2 (|dead − |alive ), while
µ gives 12 to |dead and 12 to |alive .
One can say that the essence of this difference between these theories lies
in different choices of which quantity is given by a simple, namely quadratic,
expression in ψ:

r

the probability distribution Pψ of the history of the PO both in GRWf
and OQT, see (19)

r

the probability distribution ρ ψ of the PO at time t in BM,
ρ ψ (q, t) = |ψ(q, t)|2

r

(22)

the PO itself at time t in GRWm,
˜
˜
m(x, t) = ψt |(x)
ψt with (x)
=

N


i ) .
mi δ(x − Q

(23)

i =1

Note in particular the rather different roles that ‘|ψ|2 ’ can play for different
quantum theories and different choices of the PO.

5.2 Primitive ontology and equivariance
In Section 2 we recalled the notion of the equivariance of the probability distribution |ψ|2 and indicated how it is the key notion for establishing the empirical
agreement between BM and the predictions of the quantum formalism (whenever the latter are unambiguous). The equivariance of |ψ|2 expresses the mutual
compatibility, with respect to |ψ|2 , of the Schrödinger evolution of the wave
function and the Bohmian motion of the conﬁguration.
It would seem natural to expect that for GRWf we also have equivariance,
but relative to the (stochastic) GRW evolution of the wave function instead
of the Schrödinger evolution. However, the concept of the equivariance of
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a sequence of measurements for OQT (see, e.g., Dürr et al. [2004b]). Neither
GRWm nor BM share this property. The easiest way of seeing this begins with
noting that (19) entails that any two ensembles of wave functions (corresponding to probability measures µ, µ on the unit sphere S of Hilbert space) with
the same density matrix,

(20)
ρ̂µ = µ(dψ) |ψ ψ| = ρ̂µ ,
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St Pψ = EPψt ,

(24)

where E denotes the average over the random ψt . With this deﬁnition, BM is
equivariant relative to the Schrödinger evolution, and GRWf and GRWm are
equivariant relative to the GRW evolution.

6 A Plethora of Theories
One may wonder whether some primitive ontologies (ﬂashes and continuous
matter density) work only with GRW-type theories while others (particle trajectories) work only with Bohm-type theories. This is not the case, as we shall
explain in this section.

6.1 Particles, ﬁelds, and ﬂashes
Let us analyze, with the aid of Table 1, several possibilities: there can be at least
three different kinds of primitive ontologies for a fundamental physical theory,
namely particles, ﬁelds, and ﬂashes. Those primitive ontologies can evolve
either according to a deterministic or to a stochastic law and this law can be
implemented with the aid of a wave function evolving either stochastically or
deterministically.

11

In order to deﬁne St properly, let Rt , t > 0, be the restriction mapping 0 → t , and Tτ the time
translation mapping t → t+τ . Then St = T−t ◦ Rt : 0 → 0 is the time shift.

Downloaded from http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/ at Periodicals Dept University Libraries Northern Illinois University on April 5, 2016

the distribution |ψ|2 is not directly applicable in this case: in fact, for GRWf
there is no random variable Q(t) whose distribution could agree or disagree
with a |ψt |2 distribution (or any other quantum mechanical distribution), since
GRWf is a theory of ﬂashes, not particles, and as such yields no nontrivial
random variable that can be regarded as associated with a ﬁxed time t. In this
framework it seems natural to consider the notion of a time-translation equivariant distribution, in terms of which we may provide a generalized notion of
equivariance as follows: Let t be the space of possible histories of the PO for
times greater than or equal to t. In trajectory theories like BM, t is the space
of continuous paths [t, ∞) → Q, where Q is the conﬁguration space; in ﬂash
theories like GRWf it is the space of ﬁnite—or countable—subsets of the half
space-time [t, ∞) × R3 . Consider an association ψ → Pψ where Pψ is a probability measure on 0 that is compatible with the dynamics of the theory. We say
that this association is equivariant relative to a deterministic evolution ψ → ψt
if St Pψ = Pψt , where  denotes the action of the mapping on measures and St
is a suitably deﬁned time shift.11 More generally, for an evolution that may be
stochastic, we say that the association is equivariant relative to the evolution
if
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Table 1. Different possibilities for the PO of a theory are presented: particles,
ﬁelds, and ﬂashes.
Fields

Flashes

BM
SM, BTQFT, BMW, GRWp

BQFT, Sm
GRWm

GRWf, Sf, Sf

These different primitive ontologies can evolve according to either deterministic or stochastic laws. Corresponding to these possibilities we have a variety of physical theories:
Bohmian mechanics (BM), Bohmian quantum ﬁeld theory (BQFT), a mass density ﬁeld
theory with Schrödinger evolving wave function (Sm), stochastic mechanics (SM), Belltype quantum ﬁeld theory (BTQFT), Bell’s version of many-worlds (BMW), a particle
GRW theory (GRWp), GRW theory with mass density (GRWm), GRW theory with
ﬂashes (GRWf), and two theories with ﬂashes governed by Schrödinger (or Dirac) wave
functions (Sf and Sf ). For a detailed description of these theories, see the text.

BM is the prototype of a theory in which we have a particle ontology
that evolves deterministically according to a law speciﬁed by a wave function that also evolves deterministically. The natural analog for a theory with
particle ontology with indeterministic evolution is stochastic mechanics (SM),
in which the law of evolution of the particles is given by a diffusion process while the evolution of the wave function, the usual Schrödinger evolution, remains deterministic (see Nelson [1985] and Goldstein [1987] for
details). Another example involving stochastically evolving particles with a
deterministically evolving wave function is provided by a Bell-type quantum
ﬁeld theory (BTQFT) in which, despite the name, the PO is given by particles evolving indeterministically to allow for creation and annihilation (for a
description, see Dürr et al. [2004a]; Dürr et al. [2005b]; Bell [1986]). Another
possibility for a stochastic theory of particles is a theory GRWp in which
the particle motion is governed by (1) but with a wave function that obeys a
GRW-like evolution in which the collapses occur exactly as in GRW except
that, once the time and label for the collapse has been chosen, the collapse is
centered at the actual position of the particle with the chosen label, rather than
at random according to Equation (7). (A garbled formulation of this theory is
presented in Bohm and Hiley [1993], p. 346.)
What in Table 1 we call a Bohmian quantum ﬁeld theory (BQFT) involves only ﬁelds, evolving deterministically (Bohm [1952]; Struyve and Westman [2006]). Another example is provided by the theory Sm in which the
PO is given by the mass density ﬁeld (12) but evolving with a Schrödinger
wave function—always evolving according to Schrödinger’s equation, with
no collapses. GRWm provides an example of a theory of ﬁelds that evolve
stochastically.
Concerning theories with ﬂashes, these are inevitably stochastic, and GRWf,
in which the ﬂashes track the collapses of the wave function, is the prototype.
However, there are also theories with ﬂashes in which the wave function never
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Deterministic
Indeterministic

Particles
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i

 2

∂ψ
∇i2 ψ +
Vi (qi ) ψ ,
=−
∂t
2mi
N

N

i =1

i =1

(25)

and suppose that, as in GRWf, each of the ﬂashes is associated with one of
the particle labels 1, . . . , N. Given the ﬂashes up to the present, the next ﬂash
occurs with rate Nλ, and has a label I ∈ {1, . . . , N} that is randomly chosen
with uniform distribution. If this ﬂash occurs at time TI , its location X is
random with probability distribution
P(X ∈ d XI |I, TI , {Xk , Tk }k=I ) = N |ψ(X1 , T1 , . . . , XN , TN )|2 d XI ,

(26)

where N is a normalizing factor, ψ = ψ(q1 , t1 , . . . , q N , tN ) is a multi-time wave
function evolving according to the set of N equations
i

∂ψ
2 2
=−
∇ ψ + Vi (qi ) ψ
∂ti
2mi i

(27)

for every i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, and Tk and Xk are, for k = I, the time and location
of the last ﬂash with label k. The reason that this model is assumed to be
12
13

Here S stands for Schrödinger (evolution). Using this notation, we have that BM = Sp.
Accordingly, Equation (11) is replaced by
P X1 ∈ d x1 , T1 ∈ dt1 , I1 = i 1 , . . . , Xn ∈ d xn , Tn ∈ dtn , In = i n |ψt0
n

= λn e−Nλ(tn −t0 )

ψtk |i k (xk )ψtk d x1 dt1 · · · d xn dtn ,
k=1

where i (x) is the collapse operator given by (4).
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collapses. Such theories are thus arguably closer to BM than to GRWf. We
consider two examples.
In the ﬁrst example, denoted by Sf,12 the PO consists of ﬂashes with their distribution determined by a Schrödinger wave function ψ = ψ(q1 , . . . , q N ) that
evolves always unitarily, as in BM, according to the N-‘particle’ Schrödinger
evolution (2). The ﬂashes are generated by the wave function exactly as in
GRWf. Thus, the algorithm, whose output is the ﬂashes, is the same as the one
described in Section 3, with steps 1, 2, and 3, with the following difference: the
ﬁrst sentence in step 2 is dropped, since no collapse takes place. In other words,
in Sf ﬂashes occur with rate (8) but are accompanied by no changes in the
wave function.13 (This ﬂash process deﬁnes, in fact, a Poisson process in spacetime—more precisely, a Poisson system of points in R4 × {1, . . . , N}—with
intensity measure r ((x, t), i ) = r (x, i |ψt ) given by (8).) Note that, in contrast to
the case of GRWf, one obtains a well-deﬁned theory by taking the limit σ → 0
i − x),
˜ i (x) given by 
˜ i (x) = δ( Q
in (4), that is by replacing i (x) in (8) with 

where Qi is the position operator of the i th ‘particle.’
Our last example (Sf ) is the following. Consider a nonrelativistic system
of N noninteracting quantum particles with wave function satisfying the
Schrödinger equation
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6.2 Schrödinger wave functions and many-worlds
A rather peculiar theory representing the world as if it were, at any given time,
a collection of particles with classical conﬁguration Q = (Q1 , . . . , Q N ) is Bell’s
version of many-worlds (BMW) (Bell [1981]). In BMW, the wave function ψ
evolves according to Schrödinger’s equation and (Bell [1981])
instantaneous classical conﬁgurations . . . are supposed to exist, and to be
distributed . . . with probability |ψ|2 . But no pairing of conﬁgurations at
different times, as would be effected by the existence of trajectories, is
supposed.

This can be understood as suggesting that the conﬁgurations at different times
are not connected by any law. It could also be regarded as suggesting that conﬁgurations at different times are (statistically) independent, and that is how we
shall understand it here. The world described by BMW is so radically different
from what we are accustomed to that it is hard to take BMW seriously. In fact,
for example, at some time during the past second, according to BMW, there
were on the earth dinosaurs instead of humans, because of the independence
and the fact that, in any no-collapse version of quantum theory, there are parts
of the wave function of the universe in which the dinosaurs have never become
extinct. In this theory, the actual past will typically entirely disagree with what
is suggested by our memories, by history books, by photographs and by other
records of (what we call) the past.
Also Sf and Sm, though they are simple mathematical modiﬁcations of
GRWf and GRWm, respectively, provide very different pictures of reality, so
different indeed from what we usually believe reality should be like that it would
seem hard to take these theories seriously. In Sf and Sm, apparatus pointers
never point in a speciﬁc direction (except when a certain direction in OQT
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noninteracting is precisely to guarantee the existence of the multi-time wave
function in (26). Sf is an example of a theory with a ﬂash ontology that
arguably is empirically equivalent to OQT (unlike GRWf)—at least, it would
be if it were extended to incorporate interactions between particles—and avoids
the many-worlds character of Sf (see Section 6.2 below).
A provisional moral that emerges is that relativistic invariance might be
connected with a ﬂash ontology, since GRWf is the only theory in Table 1 (except
for Sm and Sf, which have a rather extraordinary character that we discuss
in Section 6.2 below) of which we know how it can be made relativistically
invariant without postulating a preferred foliation of space-time (or any other
equivalent additional structure). Finally, note that all the theories in Table 1 are
empirically equivalent (suitably understood) to OQT except GRWm, GRWf,
and GRWp.
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would have probability more or less one), but rather all directions are, so to
speak, realized at once. As a consequence, one is led to conclude that their
predictions don’t agree with those of the quantum formalism. Still, it can be
argued that these theories do not predict any observable deviation from the
quantum formalism: there is, arguably, no conceivable experiment that could
help us decide whether our world is governed by Sf or Sm on the one hand or
by the quantum formalism on the other. The reason for this surprising claim
is that Sf and Sm can be regarded as many-worlds formulations of quantum
mechanics. Let us explain.
At ﬁrst glance, in an Sf or Sm world, the after-measurement state of the
apparatus seems only to suggest that matter is very spread out. However, if one
considers the ﬂashes, governed by the rate (8), or the mass density (12), that
correspond to macroscopic superpositions, one sees that they form independent
families of correlated ﬂashes or mass density associated with the terms of the
superposition, with no interaction between the families. The families can indeed
be regarded as comprising many worlds, superimposed on a single space-time.
Metaphorically speaking, the universe according to Sf or Sm resembles the
situation of a TV set that is not correctly tuned, so that one always sees a
mixture of two channels. In principle, one might watch two movies at the
same time in this way, with each movie conveying its own story composed of
temporally and spatially correlated events.
Thus Sf and Sm are analogous to Everett’s many-worlds (EMW) formulation
of quantum mechanics (Everett [1957]), but with the ‘worlds’ explicitly realized in the same space-time. Since the different worlds do not interact among
themselves—they are, so to speak, reciprocally transparent—this difference
should not be regarded as crucial. Thus, to the extent that one is willing to
grant that EMW entails no observable deviation from the quantum formalism,
the same should be granted to Sf and Sm. Moreover, contrarily to EMW, but
similarly to BMW, Sf and Sm have a clear PO upon which the existence and
behavior of the macroscopic counterparts of our experience can be grounded.
This ontological clarity notwithstanding, in Sf and Sm reality is of course
very different from what we usually believe it to be like. It is populated with
ghosts we do not perceive, or rather, with what are like ghosts from our perspective, because the ghosts are as real as we are, and from their perspective we
are the ghosts. We plan to give a more complete discussion of Sf and Sm in a
future work.
We note that the theory Sm is closely related to—if not precisely the same
as—the version of quantum mechanics proposed by Schrödinger ([1926]). After all, Schrödinger originally regarded his theory as describing a continuous
distribution of matter (or charge) spread out in physical space in accord with
the wave function on conﬁguration space (Schrödinger [1926]). He soon rejected
this theory because he thought that it rather clearly conﬂicted with experiment.
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Schrödinger’s rejection of this theory was perhaps a bit hasty. Be that as it may,
according to what we have said above, Schrödinger did in fact create the ﬁrst
many-worlds theory, though he probably was not aware that he had done so.
(We wonder whether he would have been pleased if he had been).14

In this section, we elaborate on the notion of physical equivalence by considering physically equivalent formulations of GRWf and BM for which the laws of
evolution of the wave function are very different from the standard ones. We
conclude with some remarks on the notion of empirical equivalence.

7.1 GRWf without collapse
As a consequence of the view that the GRW theory is ultimately not about
wave functions but about either ﬂashes or matter density, the process ψt in
Hilbert space (representing the collapsing wave function) should no longer be
regarded as playing the central role in the GRW theory. Instead, the central
role is played by the random set F of ﬂashes for GRWf, respectively by the
random matter density function m(·, t) for GRWm. From this understanding
of GRWf as being fundamentally about ﬂashes, we obtain a lot of ﬂexibility
as to how we should regard the wave function and prescribe its behavior. As
we point out in this section, it is not necessary to regard the wave function in
GRWf as undergoing collapse; instead, one can formulate GRWf in such a way
that it involves a wave function ψ that evolves linearly (i.e., following the usual
Schrödinger evolution).
Suppose the wave function at time t is ψt . Then according to Equation (8),
for GRWf the rate for the next ﬂash is given by
r (x, i |ψt ) = λi (x)1/2 ψt 2 .

(28)

Note that ψt , given by Equation (9), is determined by ψt0 and the ﬂashes (Xk , Tk )
that occur between the times t0 and t; it can be rewritten as follows:
 I (Xn , Tn ; t)1/2 · · ·  I1 (X1 , T1 ; t)1/2 ψtL
,
ψt =  n
 I (Xn , Tn ; t)1/2 · · ·  I (X1 , T1 ; t)1/2 ψtL
n
1

(29)

where we have introduced the Heisenberg-evolved operators (with respect to
time t)
14

However, Schrödinger did write (Schrödinger [1927], p. 120) that ‘ψ ψ̄ is a kind of weightfunction in the system’s conﬁguration space. The wave-mechanical conﬁguration of the system is
a superposition of many, strictly speaking of all, point-mechanical conﬁgurations kinematically
possible. Thus, each point-mechanical conﬁguration contributes to the true wave-mechanical
conﬁguration with a certain weight, which is given precisely by ψ ψ̄. If we like paradoxes, we may
say that the system exists, as it were, simultaneously in all the positions kinematically imaginable,
but not “equally strongly” in all.’
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k

381
(30)

and the linearly evolved wave function
ψtL = Ut−t0 ψt0 ,

(31)

r (x, i |ψt ) = λ

i (x)1/2  In (Xn , Tn ; t)1/2 · · ·  I1 (X1 , T1 ; t)1/2 ψtL 2
.
 In (Xn , Tn ; t)1/2 · · ·  I1 (X1 , T1 ; t)1/2 ψtL 2

(32)

Suppose that the initial wave function is ψt0 , i.e., that the linearly evolved
wave function at time t is ψtL. Then the right-hand side of Equation (32) deﬁnes
the conditional rate for the next ﬂash after time t, given the ﬂashes in the past
of t. Note that this conditional rate thus deﬁnes precisely the same ﬂash process
as GRWf. In particular, we have that
PψtL (future ﬂashes|past ﬂashes) = P(future ﬂashes|ψt ).

(33)

The collapsed wave function ψt provides precisely the same information as
the linearly evolving wave function ψtL together with all the ﬂashes. Thus, one
arrives at the surprising conclusion that the Schrödinger wave function can be
regarded as governing the evolution of the space-time point process of GRWf,
so that GRWf can indeed be regarded as a no-collapse theory involving ﬂashes.
We say ‘no-collapse’ to underline that the dynamics of the PO is then governed
by a wave function evolving according to the standard, linear Schrödinger
equation (2). However, while the probability distribution of the future ﬂashes,
given the collapsing wave function ψt , does not depend on the past ﬂashes,
given only ψtL it does.
The two versions of GRWf, one using the collapsing wave function ψt and
the other using the noncollapsing wave function ψtL, should be regarded not as
two different theories but rather as two formulations of the same theory, GRWf,
because they lead to the same distribution of the ﬂashes and thus are physically
equivalent. We conclude from this discussion that what many have considered
to be the crucial, irreducible difference between BM and GRWf, namely that
the wave function collapses in GRWf but does not in BM, is not in fact an
objective difference at all, but rather a matter of how GRWf is presented.
We close this section with a remark. A notable difference between the two
presentations of GRWf is that while the GRW collapse process ψt is a Markov
process,15 the point-process F of ﬂashes is generically non-Markovian. In more
detail, we regard a point process in space-time as Markovian if for all t1 < t2 ,
P(future of t2 |past of t2 ) = P(future of t2 |strip between t1 and t2 ) ,
15

(34)

This means that P(future|past & present) = P(future|present). In more detail, the distribution
of the ψt for all t > t0 conditional on the ψt for all t ≤ t0 coincides with the distribution of the
future conditional on ψt0 .
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where t0 is the initial (universal) time. By inserting ψt given by Equation (29)
in (28) one obtains that
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7.2 Bohmian mechanics with collapse
In Section 7.1, we showed that GRWf can be reformulated in terms of a linearly
evolving wave function. Conversely, BM can be reformulated so that it involves
a ‘collapsed’ wave function. In this formulation, the evolution of the wave
function depends on the actual conﬁguration. The state at time t is described
by the pair (Qt , ψtC ), where Q = (Q1 , . . . , Q N ) is the (usual) conﬁguration
but ψtC : R3N → C is a different wave function than usual, a collapsed wave
function. Instead of Equations (1) and (2), the state evolves according to

ψ C∗ ∇i ψ C
d Qi
Im C∗ C (Q1 , . . . , Q N ) ,
=
dt
mi
ψ ψ

(35)

which is the same as (1) with ψ replaced by ψ C , and
 2
∂ψ C
=−
(∇i − i Ãi )2 ψ C + (V + Ṽ)ψ C
∂t
2mi
N

i

(36)

i =1

which is the same as Schrödinger’s equation except for the imaginary pseudopotentials (σ ≈ 10−7 m is the same constant as in GRW)
Ãi =

i
(qi − Qi ) ,
σ2

Ṽ = −

N
i  2
ψ C∗ ∇i ψ C
(qi − Qi ) · Im C∗ C
2
σ
mi
ψ ψ

(37)

i =1

making Equation (36) nonlinear and Q-dependent. A solution t → (Qt , ψtC )
of Equations (35) and (36) can be obtained from a solution t → (Qt , ψt ) of
Equations (1) and (2) by setting
ψ C (q1 , . . . , q N ) = exp −

N

(qi − Qi )2
2σ 2

ψ(q1 , . . . , q N ) .

(38)

i =1

16

The matter density ﬁeld m(·, t) is generically Markovian, but rather by coincidence: Given the
initial wave function, different patterns of collapse centers between time 0 and time t2 should
be expected to lead to different ﬁelds m(·, t2 ), so that the past (or equivalently ψt2 ) may be
mathematically determined from m(·, t2 ).
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where ‘future of t2 ’ refers to the conﬁguration of points after time t2 , etc. To see
that F is non-Markovian, note that the distribution of the ﬂashes in the future
of t2 depends on what happened between time 0 and time t2 , while the strip in
space-time between t1 and t2 may provide little or no useful information, as it
may, for small duration t2 − t1 , contain no ﬂashes at all.16
For a Markovian ﬂash process events in a time interval [t1 , t2 ] are independent
of those in a disjoint time interval [t3 , t4 ], which, as discussed in Section 6, would
be rather unreasonable for a model of our world. In passing, we note that Sf
can indeed be regarded as a sort of Markovian approximation of (the linear
version of) GRWf for which, at any time, the past is completely ignored in the
computation of the conditional probability of future ﬂashes.
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7.3 Empirical equivalence and equivariance
The facts that GRWf can be reformulated so that the wave function evolves
linearly, in the usual manner according to Schrödinger’s equation, and that
BM can be reformulated in terms of a collapsed wave function indicate that
the disagreement between the predictions of the two theories should not be
regarded as arising merely from the fact that they involve different wave function
evolutions. It is our contention that the source of the empirical disagreement
between BM and GRWf can be regarded as lying neither in their having different
evolutions for the wave function, nor in their having different ontologies, but
rather in the presence or absence of equivariance with respect to the Schrödinger
evolution. More explicitly, we claim that a theory is empirically equivalent to the
quantum formalism (i.e., that its predictions agree with those of the quantum
formalism) if it yields an equivariant distribution (deﬁning typicality) relative
to the Schrödinger evolution that can be regarded as ‘effectively |ψ|2 .’ Let us
explain.
The view we have proposed about the PO of a theory and the corresponding
role of the wave function has immediate consequences for the criteria for the
empirical equivalence of two theories, i.e., the statement that they make (exactly
and always) the same predictions for the outcomes of experiments.
Before discussing these consequences, let us note a couple of remarkable
aspects of the notion of empirical equivalence. One is that, despite the difﬁculty of formulating the empirical content of a theory precisely (a difﬁculty
mainly owed to the vagueness of the notion ‘macroscopic’), one can sometimes
establish the empirical equivalence of theories; for example, that of BM and
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This is readily checked by inserting (38) into Equations (35) and (36). The
ensemble of trajectories with distribution |ψ|2 cannot be expressed in a simple
way in terms of ψ C . Nonetheless, for given initial conﬁguration Q0 , we obtain
from Equations (35) and (36), with given initial ψ0C , the same trajectory t → Qt
as from Equations (1) and (2) with the corresponding ψ0 . This may be enough
to speak of physical equivalence.
One can read off from (38) that ψ C is a collapsed wave function: Whenever ψ
is a superposition (such as for Schrödinger’s cat) of macroscopically different
states with disjoint supports in conﬁguration space, then in ψ C all contributions
except the one containing the actual conﬁguration Qt are damped down to near
zero. (Still, the evolution is such that when two disjoint packets again overlap,
the trajectories display an interference pattern.)
Of course, the unitarily evolving ψt is much more natural than ψtC as a
mathematical tool for deﬁning the trajectory t → Qt ; (2) is a simpler equation
than (36). Still, the example shows that we have the choice in BM between using
a collapsed wave function ψ C or a spread out wave function ψ.
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SM or that of GRWm and GRWf; for further examples see Goldstein et al.
([2005]). Another remarkable aspect is that empirical equivalence occurs at all.
One might have expected instead that different theories typically make different
predictions, and indeed the theories of classical physics would provide plenty
of examples. But in quantum mechanics empirical equivalence is a widespread
phenomenon; see Goldstein et al. ([2005]) for discussion of this point.
Let us turn to the criteria for empirical equivalence. Since the empirical
equivalence of two theories basically amounts to the assertion that the two
worlds, governed by the two theories, share the same macroscopic appearance,
we have to focus on how to read off the macroscopic appearance of a possible world according to a theory. And according to our view about PO, the
macroscopic appearance is a function of the PO—but not directly a function
of the wave function. In cases in which one can deduce the macroscopic appearance of a system from its wave function, this is so only by virtue of a law
of the theory implying that this wave function is accompanied by a PO with
a certain macroscopic appearance. In short, empirical equivalence amounts to
a statement about the PO. This view is exempliﬁed by our proof of empirical
equivalence between GRWm and GRWf in Section 3.3. In more detail, the
position Zt of, say, a pointer at time (circa) t is a function of the PO: In BM
and GRWm it can be regarded as a function Zt = Z(Qt ) of the conﬁguration,
respectively as a function Zt = Z(m(·, t)) of the m ﬁeld, at time t, whereas in
GRWf it is best regarded as a function of the history of ﬂashes over the past
millisecond or so.
Concerning the empirical equivalence between a theory and OQT, we need
to ask whether the probability of the event Zt = z agrees with the distribution
predicted by standard quantum mechanics. The latter can be obtained from
the Schrödinger wave function ψt for a sufﬁciently big system containing the
pointer by integrating |ψt |2 over all conﬁgurations in which the pointer points
to z. Thus, regardless of what the PO of a theory is, all that is required for the
empirical equivalence between the theory and OQT is that the theory provide
the correct |ψt |2 probability distributions for the relevant variables Zt . When
this is so we may speak of an ‘effective |ψt |2 -distribution,’ or of macroscopic
|ψ|2 Schrödinger equivariance. Thus, empirical equivalence to OQT amounts to
having macroscopic |ψ|2 Schrödinger equivariance. (This applies to ‘normal’
theories in which pointers point; the situation is different for theories with a
many-worlds character as discussed in Section 6.2.)
GRWf (or GRWm) predicts (approximately) the quantum mechanical distribution only under certain circumstances, including, e.g., that the experimental control over decoherence is limited, and that the universe is young on the
timescale of the ‘universal warming’ predicted by GRWf/GRWm (see Bassi and
Ghirardi [2003], for details). Moreover, we know that GRWf, roughly speaking,
makes the same predictions as does the quantum formalism for short times, i.e.,
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8 What is a Quantum Theory without Observers?
To conclude, we delineate the common structure of GRWm, GRWf, and BM:
(i) There is a clear primitive ontology, and it describes matter in space and
time.
(ii) There is a state vector ψ in Hilbert space that evolves either unitarily or, at least, for microscopic systems most probably for a long time
approximately unitarily.
(iii) The state vector ψ governs the behavior of the PO by means of
(possibly stochastic) laws.
(iv) The theory provides a notion of a typical history of the PO (of the
universe), for example by a probability distribution on the space of all possible histories; from this notion of typicality the probabilistic predictions
emerge.
(v) The predicted probability distribution of the macroscopic conﬁguration at time t determined by the PO (usually) agrees (at least approximately)
with that of the quantum formalism.

17

Since the GRWf ﬂash process is non-Markovian, the formulation of the notion of equivariant
association given in Section 5.2 is not appropriate here; instead, Pψ should now be understood
to be a probability measure on the space of possible histories of the PO for all times, but one
whose conditional probabilities for the future of any time given its past are as prescribed, here by
 ψ
P = Pψt , with Tτ now the time translation
the formula (33). The association is equivariant if T−t
mapping on .
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before too many collapses have occurred. Thus, GRWf yields an effective |ψ|2 distribution for times near the initial time t0 . Now, if GRWf were ‘effectively
|ψ|2 -equivariant,’ its predictions would be the same as those of quantum theory
for all times. It is the absence of this macroscopic |ψ|2 Schrödinger equivariance
that renders GRWf empirically inequivalent to quantum theory and to BM.
We shall elaborate on this in a future work (Allori et al. [unpublished (a)]).
The most succinct expression of the source of the empirical disagreement
between BM and GRWf is thus the assertion that BM is effectively |ψ|2 equivariant relative to the Schrödinger evolution while GRWf is not. The
macroscopic Schrödinger equivariance of BM follows, of course, from its microscopic |ψ|2 Schrödinger equivariance, while the lack of macroscopic |ψ|2
Schrödinger equivariance for GRWf follows from the warming associated with
the GRW evolution and the fact that GRWf, as discussed in Section 5.2, is
microscopically equivariant relative to that evolution. In fact, it follows from
the GRW warming that there is, for GRWf, no equivariant association ψ → Pψ
with ψ a Schrödinger-evolving wave function.17
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The features (i)–(v) are common to these three theories, but they are also
desiderata, presumably even necessary conditions, for any satisfactory quantum
theory without observers.18
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Berndl, K., Daumer, M., Dürr, D., Goldstein, S. and Zanghı̀, N. [1995]: ‘A Survey of
Bohmian Mechanics’, Il Nuovo Cimento, 110B, pp. 737–50.

388

V. Allori, S. Goldstein, R. Tumulka and N. Zanghı̀

Downloaded from http://bjps.oxfordjournals.org/ at Periodicals Dept University Libraries Northern Illinois University on April 5, 2016

Bohm, D. [1952]: ‘A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of
“Hidden” Variables, I and II’, Physical Review, 85, pp. 166–93.
Bohm, D. and Hiley, B. J. [1993]: The Undivided Universe, London: Routledge.
Dowker, F. and Henson, J. [2004]: ‘Spontaneous Collapse Models on a Lattice’, Journal
of Statistical Physics 115, pp. 1327–39.
Dowker, F. and Herbauts, I. [2004]: ‘Simulating Causal Wave-Function Collapse Models’, Classical and Quantum Gravity, 21, pp. 1–17.
Dowker, F. and Herbauts, I. [2005]: ‘The Status of the Wave Function in Dynamical
Collapse Models’, Foundations of Physics Letters, 18, pp. 499–518.
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